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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED

1

STATES.

SUPREME COURT COXMISSION OF 01110.2

SUPREME COURT OF VERMONT.3
AGENT.

Protection given to Parties dealing with.-Persons dealing with an
agent are entitled to the same protection as if dealing with the principal,
to the extent that the agent acts within the scope of his authority:
Angk v. afe -Is. Co., S. C. U. S. Oct. Term 1875.
Pursuant to this rule, it is settled law that where a party to a negotiable instrument intrusL it to another for use as such, with blanks not
filled up, such instrument, so delivered, carries on its face an implied
authority to complete the same by filling up the blanks; but the authority implied from the existence of the blanks would not authorize the
person intrusted with the instrument to vary or alter the material terms
of the instrument by erasing what is written or printed as part of the
same, nor to pervert the scope and meaning of the same by filling the
blanks with stipulations repugnant to what. was plainly and clearly
expressed in the instrument before it was so delivered: Kd.
BANKRUPTCY.

Dischargenot impeachable collaterally.-Underthe present bankrupt
law of the United States, the discharge of a bankrupt can be set aside
for fraud in obtaining it, only by a direct proceeding for that purpose.
pursuant to the provisions of its thirty-fourth section. It cannot be
collaterally impeached, on the ground that it was fraudulently or improperly obtained: Smith v. Ramsey, 27 Ohio St.
BILLS AND NOTES.
See Agent.
Given for Patent-Rtght,and Transferredir Payment for Liquor sold
in Violation of Law.-The omission to insert in a note given for a patent-right the words, "-given for a patent-right," as required by statute,
does not render the note void. If the patent-right is good and valid,.
and forms an adequate consideration for the note, the maker cannot.
defend against a transferee of the note on the ground of the omission'o
of those words. The object of the statute was to prevent the tran~sfer
of such notes to innocent and bond-fide holders: Streit v. Waugh, 48 Vt.
Nor can the maker defend upon the ground that the plaintiff received
the note from another transferee in payment for liquor sold in violation
of law: Id.
CONFEDERATE NOTES. See Executor.

CONFLICT OF LAWS.

See Debtor and Creditor.

1 Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions.
The cases will probably be reported in 2 or 3 Otto.
2 From E.L. Do Wjtt, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 27 Ohio St. Reports.
3 From Hon. J. W. Rowell, Reporter; to appear in 48 Vermont Reports.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

See Removal of Causes.

Rcgulation of Comnnerce-State Statutes amounting to-Police Regulations- Tax on, 'assengers or Ship-owners bringing tfemn.-The case of
The City of JAew ]ork v._Miln, 1] Peters 103, decided no more than
that the requirement from the master of a vessel of a.catalogue of his
passengers landed in the city, rendered to the mayor on oath, with a correct description of their names, ages, occupations, places of birth, and
of last legal settlement, was a police regulation within the power of the
state to enact, and not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United
States : Ilenderson v. WicNam, lMfayor of the City of .ew 'York; and
Commissioners of nnigration v. .rorth German Lloy(d, S. C. U. S.
Oct. Term 1875.
The result of the Passenger Cases, 7 Howard 283, was to hold that a
tax demanded of the master or owner of the vessel for every such passenger, was a regulation of commerce by the state, in conflict with the
Constitution and laws of the United States, and therefore void : -"d.
These cases criticised, and the weight due to them as authority considered : .R1.
In whatever language a statute may be framed, its purpose and its
constitutional validity must be determined by its natural and reasonable
effect : Id.
Hence a statute which imposes a burdensome and almost impossible
condition on the ship-master, as a prerequisite to his landing his passengers, with an alternative payment of a small sum of money for each one
of them, isinfact a tax on the ship-owner for the right to land such
passengers, and in effect on the passenger himself, since the ship-master
makes him pay it in advance as part of his fare : Jd.
Such a statute of a state isa regulation of commerce, and when applied to passengers from foreign countries, isa regulation of c3mmerce
with foreign nations: .d.
Itisno answer to the charge that such regulation of commerce by a
state isforbidden by the constitution, to say that itfalls within the police
power of the states, for to whatever class of legislative powers it may belong, it is prohibited to th; states, if granted exclusively to Congress by
that instrument: Id.
Though it be conceded that there is a class of legislation which may
affect commerce, both with fdreign nations and between the states, in
regard to which the laws of the states may be valid, in the absence of
action under the authority of Congress on the same subject, this can
have no reference to matters which are in their nature national, or which
admit of a uniform system or plan of regulation: Id.
The statutes of New York and Louisiana, here under consideration,
are intended to regulate commercial matters which are not only of national but of international concern, ana which are also best regulated by
one uniform rule, applicable alike to all the sea-ports of the United States.
These statutes are therefore void, because legislation on the subjects
which they cover is confided exclusively to Congress by the clause of
the constitution which gives to that body the "right to regulate commerce with foreign nations :" d.
The constitutional objection to this tax on the passenger is not removed because the penalty for failure to pay does not accrue until twen-
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ty-four hours after he is landed. The penalty is incurred by the act of
lauding him without payment, and is, in fact, for the act of bringing
him into the state : Md.
This court does not, in this ease, undertake to decide whether or not
a state may, in the absence of all legislation by Congress on the same
subject, pass a statute strictly limited to defending itself against paupers,
convicted criminals, and others of that class, but is of opinion that to
Congress rightfully and appropriately belongs the power of legislating
on the whole subject: Id.
Regulationof Commerce--State Statutes- Taxing Immiration.-The
statute of California, which is the subject of consideration in this case,
does not require a bond for every passenger, or commutation in money,
as do the statutes of New York and Louisiana, referred to in Hlenderson
v. Wickham (supra), but only for certain enumerated classes, among
which are "lewd and debauched women :" Cy Lung v. Freeman, S.
C. U. S. Oct. Term 1875.
But the features of the statute are such as to show very clearly that
the purpose is to extort money from a large class of passengers, or to
prevent their immigration to California altogether: Id.
The statute also operates directly on the passenger, for unless the
master or owner of the vessel gives an onerous bond for the future protection of the state against the support of the passenger, or pays such
sum as the Commissioner of Immigration chooses to exact, lie is not
permitted to land from the vessel : Id.
The powers which the commissioner is authorized to exercise under
this statute are such as to bring the United States into conflict with
foreign nations, and which can only belong to the Federal government:
Id.
If the right of the states to pass statutes to protect themselves in regard to the criminal, the pauper and the diseased foreigner landing
.within their borders, exists at all, it is limited to such laws as are absolutely necessary for that. purpose, and this mere police regulation cannot extend so far as to prevent or obstruct otber classes of persons from
the right to hold personal and commercial intercourse with the people
of the United States : Ad.
The statute of California in this respect extends far beyond the necessity in which the right is founded, if it exists at all, and invades the
right of Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and is
therefore void: Id.
CORPORATION.

_Foreign-Right to do business in Other State.-It is not contrary to
the laws of Ohio, nor against public policy, in the present condition of
her laws, for a foreign corporation, lawfully organized in a sister state,
to do business in Ohio: Newburg Petroleum Co. v. Weare, 27 Ohio St.
A foreign corporation, authorized by the laws of the state in which it
was organized to do business in this state, may transact business in Ohio
not inconsistent with Ohio laws; may sue and be sued in our courts. Id.
Persons entering into contract with such foreign corporation concerning property, or rights in property, appropriate to its business in Ohio,
will be estopped, after dealing with said corporation, recognizing by
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their acts" its validity and receiving the benefits of the contract, from
denying the power of the corporation to-make the contract, in an action
on the contract: Id.
COVENANT.

See Warranty.
See Husband and Wife.

DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

Appointment of Debtor as Administrator.-The principle that the
appointment of a debtor as administrator converts the debt into assets in
his hands to be accounted for, does not apply to one who is only conditionally liable to the estate: Shields, Adm'r, v. Odel, Adm'ar of Moore,
27 Ohio St.
The appointment as administrator de l1onis von, with the will annexed,
of one who was surety on the bond of the previous executor, does not
make a debt due the estate from such executor assets in the hands of
such administrator by reason of his suretyship: Id.
Assignment- Conflict of Laws.-An assignment of personal property
and choses in action by an insolvent debtor for the benefit of creditors
in conformity to the laws of the state df New York, where such debtor
resided and did business, operates to transfer the right of action to re-'
cover said ehoses in action to the assignee, and he may maintain an action
as such assignee in the courts of this state, to collect the same, although
said assignment, as authorized by the laws of New York, gives preferences to certain of the creditors : Fuller v. Steiglitz. 27 Ohio St.
In case of such an assignment of choses in action, the law of th.e
domicile of the assignor controls and determines what is a sufficient transfer to authorize the assignee to collect the same : Id.
The principles of comity between states will allow such assignee to
maintain an action, in the courts of this state, against one of its citizens,
to collect the same, notwithstanding such preferences, in the absence of
any set-off or other defence to such action, or of any lien or charge
against said claim under the laws of Ohio, by the debtor: Id.
DEED.
Parol Evidence to vary- Construction.-When a general description
in a grant is followed by a particular description, the particular description must govern ; and if parol evidence of the situation, surroundings,
and appellations of the subject of the grant at the time of its execution,
would tend to make the general description comprehend more than the'
particular description, it would tend to contradict the deed in its true
construction, and be inadmissible : Fletcher v. Cllark, 48 Vt.
In this case it was held that the particular description did not embrace
the demanded premises, and parol evidence to bring them within the
general description was excluded: Id.
EMINENT DOMAIN.

ESTOPPEL.

See Statute.

See Corporation.

EVIDENCE.

See Deed.

EXCHANGE.
Implied Warranty-Burden of Proof.-A warranty of title is implied
in a contract of exchange, the same as in a contract of sale.: Patee v.
Pelton, 48 Vt.
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In case for deceitfully exchanging property with plaintiff upon 'which
another had a lien, it was held not to rest upon plaintiff to show that he
-had no notice of the lien at the time of exchange : Id.
EXECUTION. See Offcer.
ExxcuToR. See Debtor and Creditor.
-Accountability of- When forced to receive .Money contrary to his wishes
--J'arisdition.-Wherean executor was forced by a military power that
he could not control, to receive a sum of money from one of the debtors
of the estate, in Confederate money, and to pay it over to the receiver
of the Confederate States, and he acted contrary to his wishes, he was
excused from accountability for this amount: Rockhold v. Rockhold et
al., S. C. U. S. Oct. Term 1875.
Such a case does not present a Federal question of which the Supreme
Court of the United States can take jurisdiction : Id.
See Corporation.
FOREIGN CORPORATION.
HUSBAND AND WIFt.

Settlement by Zusband on Wife-Fraud on Oreditors.-Inorder to
defeat a settlement made by a husband upon his wife, it must be intended to defraud existing creditors, or creditors whose rights arc
expected shortly to supervene, or creditors whose rights may and do so
supervene-the settler purposing to throw the hazards of business in
which he is about to engage upon others, instead of honestly holding
his means subject to the chance of those adverse results to which all
business enterprises are liable : Smith et al. v. Vodyes, Assignee, S. C.
U. S. Oct. Term 1875.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.

Commencement of Running.-An ordinance of the city of Cincinnati,
making an assessment for grading and paving a street, provided that
the owners of iots on which the assessments were made should severally
pay the same within twenty days from the date of the ordinance, or be
subject to the interest and penalty allowed thereon by law. Beld, that
an action to enforce the lien of such assessment against a lot, commenced
more than six years after the date of the ordinance, but within'sixyeais
after the expiration of said twenty days, is not barred by the Statute of
Limitations: Reynolds et al. v. Green, 27 Ohio St.
MORTGAGE.

The generality of its language forms no objeetion, to
the validity of a
xirtgage. A mortgage of" the road and property" of a railroad conpany.is sufficient: Wilson v. Boyce, S. C. U. S. Oct. Term 1875.
Itis quite within the competency of a railroad company to mortgage
its lands not used for its track or appurtenances. It might be deemed
prudent and judicious to raise money upon its collateral property rather
than upon its road. It might lose its foreign lands and still be successful as a railroad company. If it should lose its track it must at once
cease to exist : Id.
NATIONAL BANK.

Dealingin Stocks.-In the honest exercise of the power to compromise
a doubtful debt owing to a bank, it can hardly be doubted that stocks
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may be accepted in payment and satisfaction, with a view to their subsequent sale or conversion into money so as to make good or reduce an
anticipated loss. Such a transaction would not amount to a dealing in
stocks: -rational Bank v. Nat. Exchange Bank, S. C. U. S. October
Term 1875.
OFFICER.

Trespasser ab initio-Damages.-If an officer advertises property
other than hay, grain, &c., taken in execution at one place, for sale at
another place, and sells it accordingly, he thereby becomes a trespasser
ab inrito, and liable for the full value of the property, notwithstanding
lie applies the proceeds of the sale upon the execution: Evarts v. Burgess, 48 Vt.
See Bills and Note&
PATENT.
REMOVAL

OF CAUSES.

Waiver of Right- ConstitutionalLaw.-The Supreme Court of the
United States having decided (20 Wallace 445) that a statute of a state
which requires a foreign insurance company, before transacting business
in the state, to waive its right to remove suits in which it is a party
from the courts of the state to the Federal courts, is repugnant to the
Constitution and laws of the United States and therefore void-that decision will be followed, though not approved by this court: Railway Passenger Assurance Co. v. Pierce, 27 Ohio St.
STATUTE.
See Constitutional Law.
In Derogation of Common Right- Construction-Eminent Domain.
-Statutes incorporating aqueduct companies, and granting rights of
entry upon private property for the purpose of constructing the aqueducts, and such like statutes, are strongly derogatory.of common right,
and no cases should be brought within them except such as come within
their terms by imperative necessity. Thus, where a statute incorporating such a company provided for entry upon any land through which it
might be necessary fbr the aqueduct to pass, it was held, in an action
of trespass qua. clau., that the statute was no justification, it not appearing that it was necessary to enter upon the locus in guo : Farnsworth v. Goodhue, 48 Vt.
WARRANTY.
See Exchange.
Covenant against Encumbrances and to defend Title.-The defendant
conveyed land to the plaintiff, with covenants against encumbrances,
and to defend the title conveyed. There was then existing a mortgage
on the land made by a prior owner, and the holder of the mortgage
afterward brought suit against the mortgagor and both of the parties to
this case, and obtained judgment subjecting the land to the payment
of the mortgage The land was sold on the judgment, and deeded to
the purchaser, who thereupon obtained possession Subsequently, at
the suit of the defendant, on error, the judgment was reversed: Held1. The eviction of the plaintiff, under the judgment on the mortgage,
-was a breach of the covenants of warranty in the deed, and thereupon
a right of action thereon accrued in favor of the plaintiff. 2. The subsequent reversal of the judgment did not affect the sale of the land and
consequent eviction of the plaintiff, and did not deprive him of hs right
-of action on the covenants of warranty: Smith v. Dixon, 27 Ohio St.

